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Abstract
While long-term factors have lost ground in explaining how voters
choose a party, short-term factors are generally thought to have be-
come more important. While the first aspect is well-document, em-
pirical evidence on the latter aspect is relatively sparse. This paper
investigates the question whether dealignment is associated with an
increase in weight of short-term factors by comparing how volatile
and stable voters decide what party to vote for. To this end, panel
data on voting behavior in the British 2010, the German 2005 and
the Dutch 2003 elections are employed. Both explanatory models of
vote choice as well as voters’ self-reported motivation to vote for a
particular party are analysed and the short-term factors focused upon
are leaders and performance evaluations. The main conclusion from
the analyses seems to be that, contrary to conventional wisdom, these
short-term factors are not of more important for the volatile than what
holds for stable voters.
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1 Introduction
Over the past decades, the bonds between voters and parties has been eroding
through a process labeled dealignment. This trend is apparent from declining
turnout levels, a sharp decrease of party membership rates and increasing
levels of electoral volatility (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002, Dalton, 2007).
As an important aspect of change, scholars have noted that the vote
choice process of electorates in advanced industrial democracies has altered
substantially. At both sides of the Atlantic, it seems as if the earlier dominant
forces shaping voting behavior are gradually losing ground. In the United
States, scholars have noted a substantial erosion of party attachments (Dal-
ton and Wattenberg, 2002). In the established democracies in Europe, on
the other hand, it is the impact of social cleavages on voting behavior that
has been shown to be waning (Clark and Lipset, 1991, Franklin, Mackie and
Valen, 2009, Evans and Tilley, 2011, Best, 2011).
The finding of the waning of structural factors in voting behavior has led
scholars to speculate on what factors have replaced for the impact of partisan-
ship and cleavages on vote choices. It is then assumed that we should observe
a shift from long-term factors of voting behavior towards short-term deter-
minants. Scholars have argued that issue-positions, aspects of accountability
and leader images should all become more important in the vote choice pro-
cess (Walczak, van der Brug and de Vries, 2012, Costa Lobo, 2006). While
there is a fierce debate on the decrease of partisanship over time and a rich
literature on whether or not cleavages have declined, the question whether
other factors are becoming increasingly important has received remarkably
little attention. As a consequence, there is only scant empirical evidence for
the claim that short-term factors are indeed gaining in importance. If so,
then equally important is the question what type of short-term determinants
are becoming more important. As Dalton et al. (2002, p. 60) have argued,
there are two possible options; either the dealigned make well-thought out
vote choices or they become vulnerable to the demagogic appeals of populist
parties and politicians.
As holds for all processes of political change, dealignment proceeds grad-
ually only. A number of aspects of voting behavior, however, are regularly
pointed out as being consequences of dealignment. Scholars have argued that
a rise in electoral volatility, in late-decision making and in split-ticket voting
are all indications of the erosion of strong bonds between parties and voters
(Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002, Lachat, 2007). If dealignment implies a shift
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towards the short term, then this should be obvious from how the dealigned
decide what party to vote for. In the current paper this question is inves-
tigated by focusing on differences in voting behavior and in reasons for the
vote choice between stable and volatile voters.
The paper is structured as following. First comes an overview of the
literature on the waning of long-term determinants of vote choices on the
one hand and the alleged increase in importance of short-term vote choice
determinants on the other. Next comes a presentation of the data used;
which are representative panel data on recent elections in Germany (2005),
Great Britain (2010) and the Netherlands (2003). These data allow for a
clear operationalization of stable and volatile voters, which is crucial for the
argument that is being made. After presenting the results of the analyses,
the paper ends with some concluding remarks and thoughts on the next steps
to take.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Dealignment
Since the publication of The American Voter, partisanship has been consid-
ered a crucial variable in studies of voting behavior (Campbell et al., 1964). It
was soon claimed, however, that psychological attachments between parties
and voters were weakening (Dalton, 2007). Ever since, there has been a fierce
debate on whether or not we are witnessing a process of dealignment and on
the extent to which partisanship is indeed eroding (Dalton, 2007, Bartels,
2002). Within Europe, the observed decline of stability has been linked to a
decrease of structural factors of voting behavior and cleavages most impor-
tantly (Franklin, Mackie and Valen, 2009, Clark and Lipset, 1991). There
is still quite some debate on the continued relevance of factors as class or
religion on vote choices (Evans and Tilley, 2011, Nieuwbeerta, Graaf and
Ultee, 2000, Brooks, Nieuwbeerta and Manza, 2006, Knutsen, 2004, Jansen,
Evans and de Graaf, 2013). It is nevertheless fair to conclude that the im-
pact of structural factors on voting behavior has eroded considerably over the
last couple of decades (Franklin, Mackie and Valen, 2009, Evans and Tilley,
2012).
The consequences of dealignment are apparent in a number of aspects
of political behavior. Without the strong mobilizing influence of political
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parties, turnout rates have been decreasing in most advanced industrial
democracies (Franklin, Lyons and Marsh, 2004, Franklin, 2004). Further-
more, scholars have noted a sharp decline in the number of citizens being a
member of a political party (Van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2012). Most
importantly, electoral results have become more instable. Even though this
trend was still questioned in the 1990s (Mair, 1993), its continuation has led
to an accummulation of evidence pointing out an increase of electoral volatil-
ity (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002, Mair, 2005). The increase in volatility is
evident from increased shifts in the vote shares that parties obtain in subse-
quent elections (also called net volatility) (Pedersen, 1979). At an individual
level, inter-election switching, campaign-switching and split-ticket voting are
all considered to indicate dealignment (Lachat, 2007). Additionally, late de-
ciding what party to vote for is generally considered to be an indicator of
dealignment as well (Blais, 2004, McAllister, 2002).
The fact that change is occurring in multiple countries has led Russell
Dalton (2002) to refute the claim that the roots of change are to be found
in particular political events or circumstances. Instead, he has argued that
”... party ties were generally eroding as a consequence of social and polit-
ical modernization” (Dalton, 2002, p. 22). The process of modernization
regularly referred to when explaining why citizens have become dealigned
from parties are individualization and cognitive mobilization (Dalton, 1984,
Inglehart, 1977, Thomassen, 2005). With increased levels of education and a
multiplication of the available sources for political information, citizens are
no longer in need of stable attachments to political parties.
2.2 Short-term determinants of voting behavior
The observation that the impact of structural factors on voting behavior is
waning, offers a challenge to theories of voting behavior. Thinking in terms
of the classical image of a funnel of causality that leads to a vote choice,
scholars have assumed that dealignment implies a shift of weight towards the
short-term (Walczak, van der Brug and de Vries, 2012, Costa Lobo, 2006).
Compensating for the erosion of partisanship or cleavages, it is argued that
factors such as issues, performance evaluations or leaders are becoming more
important predictors of vote choices (Walczak, van der Brug and de Vries,
2012, Costa Lobo, 2006, Dalton, 2002).
While there is a rich literature investigating the decline of long-term fac-
tors in the vote choice process, there is only scant evidence for the alleged
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increase of short-term factors. Looking at differences between generations,
Walczak et al. (2012) did find issues to have stronger effects explainig the
party preferences of younger generations than is the case for older genera-
tions. They could not find a similar relation for the impact of performance
evaluations, however. Kayser and Wlezien (2011), by contrast, do show
that a decline of partisanship is associated with an increase of the economic
vote. Kosmidis and Xezonakis (2010) have furthermore shown that eco-
nomic evaluations are more important to late deciders. The literature on the
personalization of politics additionally implies that leaders should become
stronger predictors of vote choices as dealignment proceeds (Garzia, 2013,
2011, McAllister, 2007). Even though this is often considered self-evident,
Gidengil (2013) does not find empirical support for the expectation that
leaders are of more importance for apartisans than for partisans.
Even though the bit of empirical research available proves to be rather
mixed, we assume that conventional wisdom has it right and that short-
term factors (issues, performance evaluations and leaders) are indeed more
important for the dealigned.
2.3 ’Calculating or capricious?’
The process of dealignment is generally thought to have freed voters to choose
their parties independently (Rose and McAllister, 1986). The debate on the
normative implications thereof, however, is still ongoing. Dalton (2002, p.
60) has argued that there are basically two main options. Either dealign-
ment is ”producing a deliberative public that more closely approximates the
classic democratic ideal”, or populist appeals are becoming more important
(Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002, Aarts and Thomassen, 2008). Similarly, in
his study of late-deciders, McAllister (2002) distinguishes between calculat-
ing late-deciders on the one hand and capricious late deciders on the other.
While the first are interested in politics, the latter group is not. As a con-
sequence, capricious late deciders are thought to be deciding what party to
vote for almost randomly while the calculating group is expected to make
well-thought out decisions.
The question what option is the more likely one ties in to the debate
on the characteristics of dealigned voters in general and volatile voters more
specifically. While instability was originally linked to low levels of politi-
cal sophistication (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1963), Dalton’s frame-
work of cognitive mobilization has led to questioning this assumption. The
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main argument is that higher levels of political sophistication make the re-
liance on partisanship redundant. These high sophisticated apartisans are
then thought to thoughtfully reconsider their vote at each election, which
renders them volatile (Dalton, 1984, 2007). Most of the empirical research
however does indicate that apartisanship is still -and even more strongly so
than in the past- related to low levels of political sophistication (Albright,
2009, Dassonneville, Hooghe and Vanhoutte, 2012, 2014, Marthaler, 2008).
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that volatile voters should not
be considered to be a homogeneous group. Volatile voters can be low as
well as high politically sophisticated, and their precize level of political so-
phistication most likely affects what factors guide their vote choices. More
specifically we could expect leaders to be more important predictors for lower
sophisticated volatile voters while performance evaluations are expected to
be more important for high sophisticated volatile voters.
3 Data and Methods
We investigate the question of whether short-term factors are indeed of more
importance for the dealigned by focusing on party-switching. Volatility is
generally considered to be one of the main consequences of the process of
dealignment, and is thought to be driven by the fact that voters have come
to choose independently what party to vote for rather than relying on party
identification or membership of particular groups in society.
Other scholars have similarly investigated the impact of dealignment on
vote choice determinants by focusing on the timing of the vote decision. In
such approaches, the late-deciders are considered dealigned, as opposed to
those who decided long before what party to vote for. This approach, how-
ever, implies a reliance on a question that comes with serious measurement
issues due to a strong reliance on voters’ memory (McAllister, 2002, Gidengil,
2013). Using information on whether or not voters switched parties from one
election to another can be considered a more objective measure of volatility,
if not based on recalled vote choices (Waldahl and Aardal, 2000). In this
paper, therefore, panel-data is used to distinguish between voters who re-
mained loyal to their party (stable voters) and voters changing parties from
one election to the next (volatile voters).
The data used for the current paper are the data from the 2005-2010
British Election Panel, the 2002-2005 panel-component of the German Lon-
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gitudinal Election Study and the 2002-2003 panel of the Dutch Parliamentary
Election Studies. These data allow us to investigate voting behavior in the
British 2010, German 2005 and Dutch 2003 elections. We hence cover a set
of elections in advanced European democracies that vary considerably in the
extent to which there is volatility. This variation becomes apparent from
looking at figures of net volatility in each of the countries. As clear from
Figure 1, the Netherlands have gone through the most pronounced increase
of volatility, with elections after 1990 constantly at a high level. For Great
Britain and Germany, the pattern is one of ups and down, although in both
countries, recent elections seem to become somewhat more unstable. All of
the elections focused upon in this paper, seem to be representative for recent
elections in those countries.
In a first step, we investigate voting behavior in each of the elections
by estimating basic models of vote choice. Besides some basic structural
determinants of the vote choice (socio-demographics, cleavages, party identi-
fication and left-right positions), the short-term factors focused upon in this
paper are leaders on the one hand and performance evaluations on the other
hand. For leaders information from feeling thermometers is included. The
impact of performance evaluations is assessed by the inclusion of a retrospec-
tive sociotropic economic evaluation if available. This holds for the British
and the German case, but for the Dutch 2003 election, a more general mea-
sure of satisfaction with the government is relied on.
Operationalizing volatility by means of panel data does come at the cost
of problems of panel attrition. As a consequence, when including information
on whether or not voters have switched parties from one election to the next,
the sample sizes are reduced. Due to this reduction in sample size, the
analyses are focused on the larger parties only. Additionally, this reduction
in sample sizes renders multinomial logit regressions inefficient, which is why
logistic regressions for voting for each of the parties included are estimated
separately.
In order to assess whether the short-term variables of interest are indeed
of more importance for the volatile as compared to the stable, interaction
terms are included. Each of the short-term indicators is hence interacted
with a volatility dummy.
In a second step, we validate the conclusions from the vote choice models
by looking at voters’ reported reasons for the vote choice. The information
from a closed-ended question in the British case and from an open-ended
question in the case of Germany and the Netherlands is broken down by
7
Figure 1: Pedersen index of net volatility over time (1960-2010) in Great
Britain, Germany and the Netherlands
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Ne
t v
ola
tili
ty
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Election year
Net volatility in Great Britain
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Ne
t v
ola
tili
ty
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Election year
Net volatility in Germany
5
10
15
20
25
30
Ne
t v
ola
tili
ty
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Election year
Net volatility in the Netherlands
Source: Own calculations based on election results. Germany before and after unification
are considered different time series.
8
whether or not a voter changed parties from one election to the next. We
then simply compare te mean values of the extent to which each of the vote
choice reasons was mentioned by stable and volatile voters respectively.
4 Results
4.1 Vote choice determinants
The first country for which we investigate what explains vote choices is Great
Britain. In Table 2, we present the results of a set of basic models explain-
ing voting Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democrats in the British 2010
elections. In each of the models, voting for the party of interest is con-
trasted with voting for any other party. The models include some basic
socio-demographics (gender, age, religion and income). Furthermore, given
its importance in the British context, the impact of party id is controlled
for. The short-term factors are of most interest for our analyses. We include
respondents’ feelings towards each of the party leaders (Labour leader and
prime minister Gordon Brown, Conservatives’ leader David Cameron and
Nick Clegg, the leader of the Liberal Democrats). As a second short-term in-
dicator, economic evaluations are controlled for by means of a retrospective
sociotropic assessment of the economy. As evident from the results, most
of these factors do indeed contribute significantly to explaining what party
British voters have voted for. Additionally, effects are in expected directions,
with e.g. a more positive attitude towards Labour leader Brown significantly
increasing the probability of voting Labour but decreasing the probabilities
of voting Conservative or Liberal Democrat. The effect of economic evalu-
ations as well is in expected directions, with a more positive assessment of
the national economy significantly increasing the probability that one votes
for the Labour incumbent. Overall, the pseudo-R2 statistics vary but each
indicate a relatively good model fit.
All in all, traditional theories of voting behavior appear to still explain
a considerable amount of the variance in voting behavior. It is generally
thought, however, that the process of dealignment is an important challenge
of these classical theories. In order to verify this assertion, we use the same set
of predictors for explaining the votes of stable and volatile voters respectively
(results not shown). Doing so it is clear that the model fit for stable voters is
considerably higher than the model fit for the volatile. Focusing on voting for
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Table 1: Logistic regression of voting in British 2010 elections
Labour Conservatives Liberal Democrats
Female 0.059 (0.151) 0.038 (0.156) -0.062 (0.134)
Age 0.003 (0.006) -0.004 (0.006) -0.013∗ (0.005)
Religion (ref: other)
Catholic 0.539 (0.296) -0.023 (0.303) -0.707∗ (0.311)
Protestant -0.092 (0.166) 0.477∗∗ (0.165) -0.076 (0.147)
Income 0.007 (0.024) 0.077∗∗ (0.026) 0.016 (0.021)
Labour ID 1.844∗∗∗ (0.171) -0.866∗∗∗ (0.235) -0.266 (0.168)
Conservative ID -0.870∗ (0.342) 1.641∗∗∗ (0.176) -1.454∗∗∗ (0.250)
Liberal Democrats ID -1.475∗∗∗ (0.385) -0.780∗∗ (0.296) 2.172∗∗∗ (0.209)
Brown 0.354∗∗∗ (0.031) -0.141∗∗∗ (0.034) -0.113∗∗∗ (0.029)
Cameron -0.116∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.568∗∗∗ (0.040) -0.168∗∗∗ (0.028)
Clegg -0.126∗∗∗ (0.033) -0.196∗∗∗ (0.036) 0.447∗∗∗ (0.035)
Economy 0.210∗∗ (0.070) -0.100 (0.081) -0.005 (0.065)
Constant -3.077∗∗∗ (0.490) -2.892∗∗∗ (0.524) -2.093∗∗∗ (0.439)
N 2178 2178 2178
pseudo R2 0.495 0.575 0.350
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Labour, the pseudo-R2-statistic is 0.720 for stable voters but only 0.202 if the
volatile are focused upon. For voting conservatives the pseudo-R2-statistics
are 0.799 and 0.340 respectively and for voting Liberal Democrats the value
is 0.553 for stable voters and drops to 0.237 among the volatile. Only taking
into consideration model fit, then, it seems as if rather than a shift in weight
of particular predictors, dealignment leads to an overall decrease in what
theories of vote choice can explain.
As a more direct test of whether short-term factors such as leaders or
performance evaluations are more important for the dealigned, in a next
step we interact party switching with each of the short-term indicators. The
results of these analyses are presented in Table ??. Surprisingly, to the extent
that interaction terms are significant, they are in opposite directions of what
we would expect. Look for example at the effect of feelings towards Gordon
Brown on voting behavior. While a more positive attitude towards Brown
increases the probability of voting Labour, the interaction term with volatility
indicates that this effect is counterbalanced for the volatile. Similar patterns
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Table 2: Logistic regression of voting in British 2010 elections - interactions
Labour Conservatives Liberal Democrats
Female 0.155 (0.195) 0.405∗ (0.198) -0.256 (0.161)
Age -0.002 (0.008) -0.005 (0.008) -0.017∗∗ (0.006)
Religion (ref: other)
Catholic 0.635 (0.383) 0.187 (0.389) -0.453 (0.364)
Protestant -0.300 (0.217) 0.079 (0.207) 0.063 (0.174)
Income -0.024 (0.031) 0.056 (0.032) 0.013 (0.025)
Labour ID 1.952∗∗∗ (0.219) -0.597∗ (0.281) -0.412∗ (0.199)
Conservative ID -0.698 (0.439) 1.555∗∗∗ (0.224) -1.575∗∗∗ (0.296)
Liberal Democrats ID -2.355∗∗∗ (0.536) -0.773∗ (0.365) 2.271∗∗∗ (0.269)
Volatile 0.238 (0.746) 0.011 (0.790) 0.192 (0.701)
Brown 0.497∗∗∗ (0.059) -0.347∗∗∗ (0.062) -0.185∗∗∗ (0.048)
Volatile*Brown -0.342∗∗∗ (0.080) 0.355∗∗∗ (0.081) 0.192∗∗ (0.066)
Cameron -0.175∗∗ (0.056) 0.817∗∗∗ (0.083) -0.207∗∗∗ (0.047)
Volatile*Cameron 0.077 (0.076) -0.288∗∗ (0.106) 0.017 (0.064)
Clegg -0.180∗∗ (0.063) -0.262∗∗∗ (0.071) 0.579∗∗∗ (0.063)
Volatile*Clegg 0.111 (0.085) 0.058 (0.088) -0.214∗ (0.086)
Economy 0.390∗∗ (0.122) -0.082 (0.145) -0.148 (0.105)
Volatile*Economy -0.284 (0.189) 0.030 (0.202) 0.298 (0.157)
Constant -2.690∗∗∗ (0.779) -3.072∗∗∗ (0.801) -1.778∗∗ (0.653)
N 1577 1577 1577
pseudo R2 0.581 0.637 0.398
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
are visible for voting for the Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats, which
would lead to the conclusion that leaders are less and not more important
determinants of vote choices of the volatile than what holds for stable voters.
The results furthermore do not provide indications for stronger performance
voting among the volatile.
Before drawing strong conclusions from the results and in order to move
beyond the ideosyncracies of one particular country or one particular election,
we also look at voting behavior in other countries. As a second step there-
fore, we investigate voting behavior in the 2005 German elections. Due to the
relatively small number of respondents voting for one of the smaller parties
(FDP, Greens or Die Linke), we restrict the analyses to voting for the larger
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parties CDU/CSU and SPD. In order not to fully disregard those respondents
we hence perform two logistic regressions contrasting voting CDU/CSU and
SPD respectively to voting for any of the other parties. As we have done
for the British case, in a first step we assess how well a basic model ex-
plains voting behavior. The basic model includes the socio-demographic
variables gender, age, religious denomination, social class and whether or
not the respondent lives in one of the East-German la¨nder. Furthermore,
party identification (with CDU/CSU or SPD) as well as respondents’ left-
right position is controlled for. The short-term predictors of interest are
feelings towards SPD-leader and Chancellor Gerhard Schro¨der and feelings
towards CDU-leader Angela Merkel on the one hand and a retrospective so-
ciotropic assessment of the economy on the other. The results of these basic
models are presented in Table 3. A look at these models illustrates that
the socio-demographic are are not strong predictors of voting for one of the
large parties. Respondents’ self-right placement does not appear to signif-
icantly affect choosing CDU/CSU or SPD either. Party identification, on
the other hand, is significantly affecting vote choice. Looking at the short-
term indicators, then, attitudes towards the leaders do significantly affect the
probability to vote for one of the large parties, while economic evaluations
do not. Overall, the models do appear to explain a considerable amount of
the variation in voting behavior, as clear from the pseudo-R2 statistics. As
was the true for the British case as well, this overall good fit masks consider-
able differences in explanatory power for explaining the vote of stable voters
on the one hand and volatile voters on the other. The results of separate
analyses for both groups (not shown) indicate that the pseudo-R2 for voting
CDU/CSU is 0.921 among stable voters but only 0.318 among the volatile.
Investigating voting SPD, the pseudo-R2 is 0.737 for stable voters and drops
to 0.282 when only the volatile are focused upon.
In line with how we proceeded for the British case, in a next step it is more
directly tested whether short-term factors are indeed more important predic-
tors of the vote choices of the volatile as compared to the stable. Therefore,
the short-term predictors (feelings towards Schro¨der, Merkel and economic
evaluations) are interacted with volatility. The results of these analyses are
presented in Table 4 and indicate that for the German 2005 elections as
well there are hardly any differences in the effects of vote choice determi-
nants of volatile and stable voters. Only one interaction term is significant
(Volatile*Schro¨der), but its implication is that attitudes towards the Chan-
cellor are less strong in predicting whether volatile voter chooses CDU/CSU
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Table 3: Logistic regressions of voting in German 2005 elections
CDU/CSU SPD
Female -0.651∗ (0.327) -0.108 (0.264)
Age 0.008 (0.010) -0.003 (0.008)
Religion (ref: other/none)
Catholic 0.801 (0.441) -0.406 (0.347)
Protestant 0.485 (0.461) 0.060 (0.394)
Social class 0.425 (0.320) 0.241 (0.269)
East 0.143 (0.428) -0.037 (0.370)
CDU/CSU ID 3.300∗∗∗ (0.465) -1.455∗ (0.649)
SPD ID 0.071 (0.561) 2.672∗∗∗ (0.355)
Left right 0.130 (0.087) 0.029 (0.076)
Schro¨der -0.226∗∗∗ (0.058) 0.359∗∗∗ (0.074)
Merkel 0.391∗∗∗ (0.077) -0.077 (0.052)
Economy -0.121 (0.172) 0.245 (0.153)
Constant -5.450∗∗∗ (1.108) -5.000∗∗∗ (1.024)
N 615 615
pseudo R2 0.614 0.491
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4: Logistic regressions of voting in German 2005 elections - interactions
CDU/CSU SPD
Female -0.483 (0.409) -0.303 (0.334)
Age 0.002 (0.013) -0.015 (0.011)
Religion (ref: other/none)
Catholic 0.700 (0.575) -0.263 (0.436)
Protestant 0.244 (0.610) 0.045 (0.493)
Social class 0.410 (0.391) 0.198 (0.336)
East 0.020 (0.546) 0.023 (0.460)
CDU/CSU ID 4.332∗∗∗ (0.642) -0.771 (0.736)
SPD ID 0.427 (0.726) 3.641∗∗∗ (0.464)
Left right 0.128 (0.115) 0.012 (0.100)
Volatile -3.067 (1.671) 0.072 (1.664)
Schro¨der -0.324∗∗ (0.099) 0.479∗∗∗ (0.135)
Volatile*Schro¨der 0.291∗ (0.136) -0.197 (0.185)
Merkel 0.428∗∗∗ (0.120) -0.112 (0.090)
Volatile*Merkel -0.173 (0.181) 0.020 (0.131)
Economy -0.292 (0.286) 0.237 (0.256)
Volatile*Economy 0.254 (0.431) 0.055 (0.382)
Constant -3.970∗∗ (1.495) -4.893∗∗ (1.530)
N 516 516
pseudo R2 0.705 0.599
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
than holds for stable voters.
A final country focused upon in this paper, is the Netherlands and vot-
ing behavior in the 2003 Dutch elections is looked at. The Dutch context is
known to be a country that has been particularly affected by dealignment,
resulting in high levels of volatility and a high extent of unpredictability of
voting behavior (Dassonneville, 2013, Mair, 2008). This fact would lead us
to assume that short-term factors are of large important in how current-day
Dutch voters decide what party to vote for. As was the case for the analyses
on the British and German elections as well, the limited number of respon-
dents voting for each of the parties leads us to focusing on the larger parties
only. In Table 5, the results of basic logistic regressions explaining voting
CDA, VVD and PVDA respectively are presented. These basic models in-
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clude a number of socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age, religion
and social class). Additionally, respondents’ self-placement on a left-right
scale is controlled for.1 For the Dutch elections as well, the short-term indi-
cators looked at are attitudes towards leaders and a performance evaluation.
The leaders included are CDA-leader and prime minister Jan Peter Balke-
nende, VVD-leader Gerrit Zalm and Wouter Bos, leader of the PVDA. As an
indicator of performance evaluations, no economic evaluations were available,
but a general assessment of satisfaction with the government’s performance is
looked at. The results in Table 5 indicate that socio-structural variables are
still important for understanding whether Dutch voters choose CDA, VVD
or PVDA. Being catholic or protestant for example significantly increases the
probability that a voter chooses CDA but decreases the probability of voting
for VVD. Furthermore, a higher social class significantly increases the prob-
ability of voting VVD but significantly decreases the probability that PVDA
is voted for. Focusing on short-term determinants of the vote choice, then,
more positive feelings towards the party leaders significantly increase the
probability that one votes for their party. Being more satisfied with the gov-
ernment’s performance, finally, does not significantly increase the probability
that one votes for an incumbent party nor does it significantly decrease the
probability of voting for a party in opposition. The overall fit of the models is
about the same, with a pseudo-R2 value of about 0.35 for each of the parties
focused upon. Interestingly, and unlike what was found for the British 2010
and the German 2005 elections, the explanatory power of models focusing
on the volatile only is not dramatically lower than what holds for the stable
only. Analyses (not shown) indicate that for voting CDA, the pseudo-R2
among the stable is 0.486 and 0.362 among the volatile. For voting VVD,
the statistics are 0.401 and 0.405 respectively and they are 0.772 and 0.701
respectively when voting PVDA is looked at.
As a final step, we add interaction terms to investigate whether the im-
pact of short-term predictors is indeed strengthened among the volatile. The
results of these analyses are presented in Table 6. In line with what was ob-
served for British and German voters, we do not find evidence for this claim.
Looking at the effect of feelings towards leaders on voting behavior, the in-
teraction terms found to be significant point in opposite directions. As such,
1Given that party identification is not commonly accepted to be a valid concept or
a strong predictor for voting behavior in the Netherlands, it is not included in the vote
choice models.
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Table 5: Logistic regressions of voting in Dutch 2003 elections
CDA VVD PVDA
Female -0.087 (0.166) 0.015 (0.198) -0.281 (0.173)
Age 0.013∗ (0.005) -0.003 (0.007) 0.005 (0.006)
Religion (ref: none)
Catholic 1.569∗∗∗ (0.209) -0.860∗∗∗ (0.252) 0.147 (0.220)
Protestant 1.052∗∗∗ (0.217) -1.168∗∗∗ (0.283) 0.129 (0.254)
Other 0.390 (0.461) -0.774 (0.524) -0.305 (0.430)
Social class -0.055 (0.094) 0.577∗∗∗ (0.123) -0.232∗∗ (0.087)
Left right 0.093 (0.049) 0.526∗∗∗ (0.068) -0.398∗∗∗ (0.055)
Balkenende 0.717∗∗∗ (0.065) -0.233∗∗∗ (0.060) -0.230∗∗∗ (0.047)
Zalm -0.113∗ (0.049) 0.620∗∗∗ (0.071) 0.002 (0.049)
Bos -0.140∗∗ (0.043) -0.099∗ (0.050) 0.768∗∗∗ (0.070)
Government satisfaction 0.092 (0.097) 0.079 (0.117) -0.060 (0.110)
Constant -6.539∗∗∗ (0.712) -7.966∗∗∗ (0.883) -2.779∗∗∗ (0.718)
N 1215 1215 1215
pseudo R2 0.345 0.330 0.377
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6: Logistic regressions of voting in Dutch 2003 elections - interactions
CDA VVD PVDA
Female -0.012 (0.209) -0.058 (0.225) 0.085 (0.322)
Age 0.003 (0.007) -0.005 (0.008) -0.014 (0.011)
Religion (ref: none)
Catholic 1.554∗∗∗ (0.250) -1.359∗∗∗ (0.287) -0.732 (0.391)
Protestant 1.394∗∗∗ (0.272) -1.490∗∗∗ (0.326) -0.307 (0.427)
Other 0.833 (0.581) -0.821 (0.600) -1.293 (0.907)
Social class -0.226 (0.121) 0.488∗∗∗ (0.137) -0.529∗∗ (0.169)
Left right 0.157∗ (0.067) 0.662∗∗∗ (0.085) -1.106∗∗∗ (0.128)
Volatile 0.051 (1.524) -1.472 (1.484) 0.308 (2.163)
Balkenende 1.079∗∗∗ (0.117) -0.469∗∗∗ (0.084) -0.665∗∗∗ (0.123)
Volatile*Balkenende -0.403∗ (0.186) 0.276∗ (0.131) 0.079 (0.200)
Zalm -0.504∗∗∗ (0.090) 0.666∗∗∗ (0.103) -0.172 (0.121)
Volatile*Zalm 0.280∗ (0.137) -0.184 (0.170) -0.006 (0.197)
Bos -0.217∗∗ (0.069) -0.200∗∗ (0.071) 0.966∗∗∗ (0.150)
Volatile*Bos -0.107 (0.116) 0.121 (0.118) 0.059 (0.253)
Government satisfaction -0.015 (0.147) 0.148 (0.161) -0.370 (0.245)
Volatile*Gov. satisfaction 0.407 (0.263) -0.009 (0.285) -0.074 (0.395)
Constant -4.669∗∗∗ (1.008) -5.901∗∗∗ (1.099) 6.636∗∗∗ (1.533)
N 819 819 819
pseudo R2 0.452 0.387 0.745
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
while positive feelings towards prime minister Balkenende significantly in-
crease the probability of voting CDA, this effect is weaker among the volatile
(see the negative significant effect of Volatile*Balkenende). With regard to
performance evaluations, finally, not only did we not observe an overall effect
on vote choices in Table 5, the volatile prove to be not significantly different
in this regard.
The results of the vote choice models presented appear to indicate that
traditional theories of voting are losing their grip on dealigned voters. We
do not find evidence for the claim that the short-term factors within the
funnel of causality are of more importance for volatile voters than they are
for those who remain loyal to their party, at least when political leaders and
performance evaluations are focused upon.
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The results obtained from the vote choice models, however, are likely to
be biased due to reciprocal causality. With regard to leaders, for example,
the problem is basically that one generally likes the leaders of the party
that one votes for, without leaders necessarily causing people to vote for this
particular party (Bellucci, Garzia and Lewis-Beck, 2014). A similar problem
is at stake when focusing on performance evaluations as well (Lewis-Beck,
Nadeau and Elias, 2008). As next step, therefore, in this paper we validate
the conclusions drawn from the vote choice models and investigate voters’
reported reasons for choosing the party they voted for.
4.2 Reported reasons for the vote choice
Election studies regularly include questions asking respondents to report
what motivated their vote choice in order to gauge vote choice heuristics.
While there is considerable debate about whether or not we can ask voters
directly what drives their vote choice, open-ended questions on reasons for
choosing a party are generally considered informative and insightful on vote
choice heuristics (Van Holsteyn, 1994, Swyngedouw, 2001). We hence use
the information obtained from such questions to observe if there are indeed
substantial differences in the reasons mentioned by stable and volatile voters.
Theoretically, for this type of questions as well, we would expect short-term
factors such as leaders or performance evaluations to be of more importance
for the volatile than for those who remain loyal to their party.
We proceed in the order as used for the vote choice models as well and look
at reasons for choosing a party in the 2010 British election first. The 2010
post-electoral survey wave of the 2005-2010 panel only included a closed-
ended question asking respondents to indicate the most important reason
for their vote choice.2 In Table 7 we break down the distributions of the
extent to which each of the answer options was chosen by whether or not a
voter switched parties between 2005 and 2010. As evident from the results,
stable and volatile voters are indeed significantly different in what they report
to be the most important reasons for their vote choice. Most importantly,
the volatile mention policies significantly less. Furthermore, leadership and
tactical considerations are reported to be the most important reason for the
vote choice significantly more often among the volatile. While all differences
2The question wording was: ’People give different reasons for why they vote for one
party rather than another. Which of the following best describes your reasons?’
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Table 7: Reasons for the vote choice in British 2010 election (% respondents
indicating reason as most important and 95% confidence intervals
Stable Volatile
The party had the best policies 67.0 [64.4;69.6] 40.4 [36.6;44.2]
The party had the best leader 9.9 [8.3;11.6] 14.8 [12.0;17.5]
I really preferred another party but it stood
no chance of winning in my constituency 7.1 [5.7;8.5] 12.4 [9.9;15.0]
I voted tactically 6.6 [5.2;8.0] 15.9 [13.0;18.7]
Other reasons 9.4 [7.8;11.0] 16.5 [13.6;19.4]
Note: Entries in bold are significantly different from each other
are significant, it has to be noted that differences are not very pronounced.
Looking at the extent to which leaders -a short term indicator by excellence-
are more important for the volatile for example, the difference is only barely
significant.
As indicated before, open-ended questions are considered a better way
to map the reasons why voters choose a party (Van Holsteyn, 1994). The
German and Dutch surveys did include questions on ’why voters voted the
way they did’ in an open-ended format, so we proceed with information from
these questions for investigating the reasons for the vote choice in the German
2005 and Dutch 2003 elections.
Table 8 gives an overview of the most often mentioned reasons for the vote
choice in the German 2005 election.3 Unlike what we saw for the closed-ended
question in the British case, there are only minor differences between the
stable on the one hand and volatile voters on the other. The only significant
difference is in the extent to which party ID, party membership or being
a long-time supporter of a party are mentioned. While almost 20% of the
stable voters mentions this as a reason for the vote, only 6% of the volatile
do so. Interestingly, the extent to which leaders or candidates are mentioned
is about the same for stable and volatile voters. This result, consequently,
does not indicate a shift towards short-term factors. It is true that long-term
stabilizing factors are only marginally important for the volatile, but no other
motivations seem to compensate therefore.
3Respondents could mention up to four reasons for their vote, which is why percentages
add up to more than 100%. The codes in the original dataset were grouped to a more
limited set of 10 categories. Only categories that were mentioned by at least 5% of the
respondents are included in the overview.
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Table 8: Reasons for the vote choice in German 2005 election (% respondents
mentioning reason and 95% confidence intervals
Stable Volatile
Program of the party and specific policies 43.7 [39.1;48.4] 37.8 [31.9;43.7]
Negative/protest/anti-large parties 22.8 [18.8;26.7] 30.0 [20.6;31.3]
Party leader or candidates 13.0 [9.8;16.1] 12.2 [8.2;16.2]
Party ID/membership/habit 19.6 [15.9;23.3] 5.7 [2.9;8.6]
The party in general 4.3 [2.4;6.2] 6.5 [3.5;9.5]
Representation of my interests 4.3 [2.4;6.2] 5.3 [2.6;8.1]
Note: Entries in bold are significantly different from each other
Finally, we have a look dat the reasons for choosing a party in the Dutch
2003 election as well.4 The results presented in Table 9 lend further leverage
to the conclusions that could be drawn from the German case. For Dutch
voters as well and as could be expected, long-term attachments (feeling,
tradition, party membership) are mentioned significantly less often by the
volatile than holds for the stable. Furthermore, for the Dutch case as well,
the difference in the extent to which candidates are mentioned by volatile
and stable voters is not significant. As was observed for the information
from the closed-ended question in the British questionnaire, however, the
volatile seem to be more tactical when casting their vote. This is evident
from the fact that the voaltile mention significantly more often than stable
voters that they want their party to be the largest.
The results from the descriptive analyses of reported reasons for the
vote choice further strengthen the conclusion of the explanatory analyses of
vote choices; there are no indications of strong short-term effects among the
volatile. On the one hand, it is evident that long-term factors are mentioned
significantly less often by the volatile than what holds for stable voters. On
the other hand, however, we do not find strong evidence for the claim that
short-term factors are consequently of more weight among these dealigned
voters.
4Coding of open-ended question as available in the orignal dataset.
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Table 9: Reasons for the vote choice in Dutch 2003 election (% respondents
mentioning reason and 95% confidence intervals
Stable Volatile
Good political program/good political ideas/
clear/good policy 30.8 [27.1;34.6] 30.8 [28.1;33.6]
Fits with my ideas 25.5 [22.0;29.1] 23.0 [20.5;25.5]
Feeling/tradition/party membership 22.3 [18.9;25.6] 13.7 [11.7;15.8]
First candidate/attracted to people on the list 12.8 [10.1;15.6] 13.3 [11.3;15.3]
Big party/party should be the biggest/stable party 8.9 [6.6;11.2] 13.6 [11.5;15.6]
Norms and values/religion 7.4 [5.2;9.5] 5.0 [3.7;6.3]
Counterweight/strategic vote/
balance in the Second Chamber 6.3 [4.4;8.3] 6.3 [4.8;7.7]
Note: Entries in bold are significantly different from each other
5 Discussion
The process of dealigment has led to substantial changes in voting behavior
and an increase in electoral instability. The changes observed furthermore
challenge traditional theories of voting behavior, as apparent from the fact
that partisanship as well as cleavages are becoming less important over time.
What is less well documented, however, is whether this decline of long-term
factors is paired with an increase of short-term factors in the vote choice
process. In this paper, this question is investigated by comparing voting
behavior of stable and volatile voters.
The results of the vote choice models do not offer evidence for the conven-
tional wisdom that dealignment is linked to more weight for the short-term.
Overall, we do observe that party-switching is a challenge for traditional
theories of voting behavior, as clear from a marked decrease in model fit
when volatile voters only are focused upon. Directly comparing the impact
of leadership and performance evaluations on the vote choice, furthermore,
our results do not support the hypothesis that these would be more impor-
tant for the volatile than for loyal voters. To the extent that interactions are
significant, they even point in opposite directions and would indicate that
leaders are less and not more important for the volatile than for the stable.
This finding, however, should be interpreted with some caution. Most
importantly so because of the issue of reciprocal causation (Bellucci, Garzia
and Lewis-Beck, 2014, Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Elias, 2008). One approach
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to deal with this problem would be to move on to multiple equation modeling
and to use instruments for the short-term factors looked at. As especially
leadership measured in a feeling thermometer format is likely to be endoge-
nous, another option would be to measure the impact of leaders on the vote
by means of leadership traits. Given that reciprocal causation is likely to
affect the results for the stable voters more than holds for the volatile, it is
essential that ways to solve endogeneity issues are dealt with respect to our
research question.
The results from the descriptive analyses on self-reported reasons for the
vote choice, however, do seem to give leverage to the claim that leaders are
not more important for the volatile than for stable voters. These results
basically point out that long-term factors are indeed more important for
stable voters, but nothing seems to really compensate for these elements
among the volatile. Even though some caution remains, the conclusion of
our analyses therefore seems to be that the decrease of long-term factors is
not compenated for by an increased weight of the short term.
The consequence of our findings could be that the volatile simply vote
randomly and that we are not able to understand how they come to a voting
decision. Before drawing that conclusion, however, more factors have to be
looked at. Most importantly, the current analyses only focus on the impact
of leaders and performance evaluations. Issues as well are considered short-
term factors by excellence, so these have to be included. Additionally, the
comparison of self-reported reasons for the vote choice seemed to indicate
that strategic considerations are more important for volatile voters. Tacti-
cal voting as well, therefore, should be looked at when explaining how the
dealigned vote.
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